

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)				
Proposed National Clearance/Investigative Policy				
FROM		EXTENSION		NO.
DD/P&M 4E-60 Hqs.				DATE 28 OCT 1980
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.	DD/Security	30		P
2.	DD/CA	7 NOV 80		R.V.
3.	DD/Sec In B/Security	NOV 7 1980		P
4.	D/S	NOV 7 1980		
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
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15.				

1-2 Please take a look at DD/P&M & DD/PS's comments & briefly make my response to my or all for benefit of D/S

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2 - 3 You have my note. I suggest we just try to get out of the task.

7 NOV 80

3-4 ↑

Bob feels other events going on in the Community & the general post-election atmosphere offer a good opportunity to set the aside. If so, he suggests getting support

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28 OCT 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

VIA: Deputy Director of Security

FROM: [REDACTED] STAT

Deputy Director of Security (P&M)

SUBJECT: Proposed National Clearance/Investigative Policy

1. I am not current on all of the developments in the Security Committee, but I share a lot of [REDACTED] concerns. In my opinion we are throwing at Gregg a lot of "pie in the sky" goals which are not going to be reached in the near term, if ever. There include such items as:

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a. Uniform PHS: This is a nice goal, and everyone would be for it in concept. However, OPPPM just recently revised our CIA forms and Harry Fitzwater has plenty of internal problems before he worries about the Community. It will be a long time coming.

b. Course for Adjudicators: The idea of a course is great, but I am less than optimistic that it will have much meaning or application until and unless we have uniformity in investigations and we all use the polygraph, with the same coverage.

c. Polygraph: This continues to be a tough sell in the Intelligence Community, [REDACTED] Again, it is an idealistic goal, but it is years away from happening.


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d. OPM Study: This is a study on five levels of sensitivity and appears to have no relevance in CIA, which was not involved in the review. We supposedly are not going to comment and are going for an exemption, but SECOM plans on responding. We are going in different directions.

e. Costs: SECOM developed a formula for computing costs of investigations and polygraph, and maybe the figures are valid. The OPM had another formula and I would feel much more comfortable if the Intelligence Community came in with one approved method of figuring costs.

f. Investigations for Secret: I do not think this has a ghost of a chance of becoming a reality. It is totally unrealistic in my view, especially when money is tight. I would be extremely cautious about recommending E.O. 12065 because we will be shooting ourselves in the foot on the resources issue.

2. I would tone down the Taylor paper and be a lot less optimistic that concrete breakthroughs are about to be made.



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